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Security and Privacy in Smart Health: Ecient
Policy-Hiding Attribute-Based Access Control
Yinghui Zhang, Member, IEEE, Dong Zheng, Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—With the rapid development of the Internet of
Things (IoT) and cloud computing technologies, smart health (s-
health) is expected to significantly improve the quality of health
care. However, data security and user privacy concerns in s-
health have not been adequately addressed. As a well-received
solution to realize fine-grained access control, ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) has the potential to ensure
data security in s-health. Nevertheless, direct adoption of the
traditional CP-ABE in s-health suers two flaws. For one thing,
access policies are in cleartext form and reveal sensitive health-
related information in the encrypted s-health records (SHRs).
For another, it usually supports small attribute universe, which
places an undesirable limitation on practical deployments of CP-
ABE because the size of its public parameters grows linearly with
the size of the universe. To address these problems, we introduce
PASH, a privacy-aware s-health access control system, in which
the key ingredient is a large universe CP-ABE with access policies
partially hidden. In PASH, attribute values of access policies are
hidden in encrypted SHRs and only attribute names are revealed.
In fact, attribute values carry much more sensitive information
than generic attribute names. Particularly, PASH realizes an
ecient SHR decryption test which needs a small number of
bilinear pairings. The attribute universe can be exponentially
large and the size of public parameters is small and constant.
Our security analysis indicates that PASH is fully secure in
the standard model. Performance comparisons and experimental
results show that PASH is more ecient and expressive than
previous schemes.
Index Terms—Smart health, Attribute-based encryption, Pri-
vacy protection, Decryption test, Large universe, Full security.
I. Introduction
SMART health (s-health) is the context-aware augmenta-tion of mobile health in smart cities, and it provides an
opportunity for accurate and ecient prevention of various
diseases and accidents [1]. As a kind of fundamental tech-
nologies in smart cities, the Internet of Things (IoT) has been
widely applied to interconnect available medical resources and
provide reliable and eective s-health services to the elderly
and patients [2]. With the rapid development of IoT [3], [4]
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and cloud computing technologies [5], [6], cloud-based s-
health is expected to provide desirable health care in the near
future. However, s-health is still in its early stages and many
concerns remain to be solved for practical applications [7]. In
particular, data security and privacy issues have become the
biggest concerns of people in s-health. For example, a patient
usually expects that his s-health records (SHRs), such as blood
pressure and pulse rate, can only be accessed by authorized
professional health caregivers. Whereas, if traditional access
control techniques are adopted, either data security is violated
or only coarse-grained access policies are allowed.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is envisioned as a highly
promising solution for realizing fine-grained access control
[8]. ABE is divided into key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and
ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [9]. In s-health, we focus on
the latter which allows SHR owners to establish specific access
policies. In a CP-ABE scheme, a user’s secret key is associated
with a set of attributes and each ciphertext is embedded with an
access policy over attributes. Although the traditional CP-ABE
schemes can be directly adopted to design fine-grained access
control systems, it is still necessary to simultaneously address
the issues of policy hiding, decryption test, large universe,
full security and policy expressiveness in CP-ABE to ensure
its secure and ecient applications in s-health.
Policy Hiding. In the traditional CP-ABE schemes, an
access policy is an access structure, which is expressed in
terms of user attributes and is sent along with a ciphertext
(e.g., an encrypted SHR) explicitly. Anyone who obtains the
ciphertext knows the associated access policy. Therefore, the
traditional CP-ABE is inappropriate for s-health since access
policies usually contain sensitive information. Let’s consider a
s-health cloud storage scenario, as shown in Fig. 1. A hospital,
which manages SHRs on behalf of its patients, outsources its
encrypted SHRs to a s-health cloud for secure storage and
sharing among health caregivers. Suppose the hospital encrypts
a SHR using CP-ABE under an access policy “(SSN: 123-260-
6 AND Status: Normal) OR (Aliation: City Hospital AND
Department: Cardiologist)”, and then outsources the ciphertext
together with the access policy to the cloud. The access policy
specifies that the SHR can only be accessed by a Cardiologist
in City Hospital or by a patient with social security number
(SSN) 123-260-6 and Normal registration status. In Fig. 1, the
data user Alice is capable of accessing the SHR while Bob is
not an authorized data user. Although Bob comes from the City
Hospital and the registration status is Normal, his department
and SSN cannot match the access policy. Obviously, if the
traditional CP-ABE scheme is used, everyone including the s-
health cloud service provider can learn the access policy and
infer that a normal user in the s-health system with social
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security number 123-260-6 is suering a heart problem. This
violates user’s privacy and shows the importance of hiding
access policies in CP-ABE.
Encrypted SHR
Data User
Name: Bob
SSN: 123-45-6789
Status: Normal
Affiliation: City Hospital
Department: Respiratory
Name: Alice
SSN: 201-802-19
Status: Don't care
Affiliation: City Hospital
Department: Cardiologist
Sensitive Attribute Values
S-Health Cloud
SSN:
123-260-6
Status:
Normal
Affiliation:
City Hospital
Department:
Cardiologist
Encrypted SHR
Data User
Access Policy
Fig. 1. An example of s-health cloud storage.
Policy hiding takes two forms, it can be either full hiding or
partial hiding. In CP-ABE schemes with access policies fully
hidden, none of the attributes in the access policy are revealed.
Although a CP-ABE scheme with fully hidden policies can be
built from attribute-hiding Inner-product Predicate Encryption
(IPE) [10], the policies can only be threshold policies which
are far less expressive than Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
(LSSS) policies. A KP-ABE scheme with fully hidden policies
can also be constructed from IPE, but it results in a superpoly-
nomial blowup in size for arbitrary formulas [11]. For s-health,
CP-ABE is more suitable than KP-ABE because it allows data
owners to choose access policies themselves. With the goal of
having a tradeo between fully hidden policies and eciency
of CP-ABE, CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden policies
have attracted many attentions recently. In CP-ABE schemes
with partially hidden access policies, only sensitive attribute
values are hidden and attribute names are sent along with
ciphertexts. Note that partial hiding CP-ABE constructions
have better performance and are adequate to protect users’
privacy. In the above example of s-health cloud storage, if the
hospital uses a partial hiding CP-ABE scheme to encrypt a
SHR, the partially hidden access policy: “(SSN:  AND Status:
) OR (Aliation:  AND Department: )”, is attached with
the encrypted SHR while the sensitive attribute values, “123-
260-6”, “Normal”, “City Hospital” and “Cardiologist”, are
hidden from the public including the cloud service provider.
Decryption Test. Recall that in CP-ABE a user’s secret
key is associated with a set of attributes, such as “(Doctor:
Cardiologist; Hospital: City Hospital)". Given a ciphertext
and the associated access policy, the decryption is successful
only if the user’s set of attributes satisfies the access policy.
A decryption test is the testing whether the user’s set of
attributes satisfies the access policy of the ciphertext before
the full decryption. In the existing policy-hiding CP-ABE
schemes, however, a user usually has to decrypt and then
decide whether or not his attributes satisfy the hidden policy in
the ciphertext, and this decryption-testing process is repeated
until a match between attributes and access policy is found
or all the possible tests have been performed. Hence, the
computation cost in decryption is very high. Some schemes
add a decryption test before the full decryption. However, their
eciency of attribute matching needs to be improved because
the computation overhead grows linearly with the complexity
of the access policy. Accordingly, it is desirable for users
to eciently decide before the full decryption whether his
attributes match the hidden policy in the ciphertext.
Large Universe. ABE can be classified into small universe
ABE and large universe ABE. In an ABE scheme supporting
small universe, the system public parameter size often depends
on the number of attributes in the system, and hence the
scale of the attribute universe is polynomially bounded in
the security parameter. In the case of large universe, the
attribute universe is allowed to exponentially scale in size,
which is a desirable feature. In fact, it is challenging to achieve
the large universe construction without imposing restrictions
on the expressiveness of the policies. If the designer of an
ABE system intends to remove the random oracle, he has to
specify a bound for the expressiveness at the setup phase, such
as the size of the attribute universe and the bound on the
policies. If the bound is too small, the system might exhaust
its functionality and will have to be thoroughly rebuilt. In a
s-health system using ABE for secure and fine-grained data
sharing, as its functionality expands and the number of user
increases, a large number of new attributes have to be added
to the system. If this number exceeds the initial bound set for
ABE with small universe construction, the authority would
have to re-deploy the system and re-encrypt all its data which
will incur a very high cost. On the other hand, if the initial
bound is too large, the increased size of public parameters will
impose an unnecessary performance burden on the system.
Full Security. Most existing ABE constructions are proven
secure in the selective model, which is a weaker security
model compared with full security. In the selective model, the
attacker must declare what the challenge ciphertext is, before
seeing the system public parameters. Therefore, fully secure
constructions are more desirable in cloud access control.
Besides the issues mentioned above, expressiveness is an-
other important issue in ABE based access control systems.
Many existing CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden policies
only support restricted access policies, which can be expressed
as AND gates on two/multi-valued attributes with wildcards.
Access policies of the form LSSS are more expressive, which
can be obtained from any monotonic boolean formula [12].
Specifically, the boolean formula can be represented as an
access tree of ` nodes, which can also be converted to an
LSSS matrix of ` rows [13].
To our knowledge, provably secure policy-hiding CP-ABE
schemes supporting decryption test can be founded in [14],
[15]. However, the scheme in [14] is proven selectively secure
and only allows AND policies. Although the scheme [15] sup-
ports LSSS policies and achieves full security, the decryption
test still suers an eciency drawback in that the number
of expensive bilinear pairings is linearly proportional to the
complexity of access policies. Besides, both schemes are not
large universe constructions.
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A. Our Contribution
In this paper, we eciently address both data security and
user privacy issues in s-health by introducing PASH, a privacy-
aware s-health access control system. In PASH, we focus on
the important issues mentioned above, i.e., attribute privacy,
decryption test eciency, large universe, expressiveness and
full security. We simultaneously solve these issues by propos-
ing a large universe CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden
access policies, denoted as PH-CP-ABE, which is the main
building block of PASH. Our rigorous security proofs and
comprehensive performance comparisons based on experimen-
tal results indicate that PASH is fully secure and very ecient.
Specifically, PASH is characterized by the following attractive
features:
 Attribute privacy. In PASH, specific and sensitive attribute
values in access policies are hidden in SHR ciphertexts and
only generic attribute names are sent along with ciphertexts.
 Decryption test eciency. In order to improve the decryption
eciency, we add a decryption test before full decryption
by generating redundant ciphertext components which are
half of that in previous work. The decryption test is very
ecient because it only involves a small number of bilinear
pairing operations in attribute matching detection.
 Large universe. PASH imposes no limitations on the at-
tribute universe in the sense that the universe can be expo-
nentially large and the size of public parameters is constant,
while most of the previous schemes have public parameters
linearly scaling with the size of the universe.
 Expressiveness and full security. PASH can handle any
access policies that can be expressed as LSSS. Also, we
use the dual system encryption methodology [11] to prove
the full security of PASH in the standard model under static
assumptions.
B. Related Work
Nowadays, an increasing number of people expect to obtain
more proactive, quality and comprehensive health care. To
achieve this, s-health is indispensable because it plays an
important role in the early-stage diagnosis based on the real-
time and long-term monitoring. As we know, many promising
technologies are involved in s-health, such as wireless body
area networks (WBAN), IoT, wireless communication, and
cloud computing. Yan et al. [16] proposed a wearable wireless
sensor network for anomaly detections of health conditions. In
particular, there has been many research focusing on WBAN
reliability [17], [18] and wireless handover authentication
[19], [20]. Xu et al. [21] proposed an IoT-based system for
emergency medical services, which can collect and interop-
erate IoT data flexibly. To ensure the quality of cloud-based
service, Zheng et al. [22] proposed a mixed approach for cloud
service negotiation. Yin et al. [2] presented an overview of the
advancement of IoT in healthcare systems. At the same time,
they pointed out that IoT-based applications are extremely
vulnerable and intensive research is needed in the areas of
security and privacy protection. In order to understand the
development of IoT, Xu et al. [3] and Li et al. [4] pointed
out the research trends and challenges of IoT in industries
and future networks. Besides, substantial research has been
done on IoT architectures [23], [24], applications of cloud
computing [5], [6], [7] and cloud security [25], [26], [27].
Nevertheless, most of the above IoT and cloud computing
technologies are not focusing on concrete data security and
privacy issues in s-health, which urgently needs to be ad-
dressed for the wide public acceptance of s-health services.
As an attractive primitive, ABE presents a promising solution
to data security in s-health. The first KP-ABE construction
[9] was proposed based on monotonic access policies. In the
generic group model, the first CP-ABE scheme was proposed
by Bethencourt et al. [28]. Cheung et al. [29] proposed another
CP-ABE scheme and proved its security in the standard model.
The scheme allows access policies of the form AND over
dierent attributes. In addition, many other ABE schemes
have been proposed, focusing on hierarchical structure [30],
ecient construction [31], [32], [33], revocation [34], [35]
and traceability [36], [37]. However, these schemes do not
consider the abuse of users’ attribute privacy and hence cannot
be directly used in s-health.
In order to protect users’ attribute privacy, policy-hiding
CP-ABE schemes have been studied [14], [15], [38], [39],
[40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46]. The notion of partially
hidden CP-ABE was introduced by Nishide et al. [41], where
AND gate policies are admissible. Similar schemes can also
be found in [42], [43]. All these schemes are proven secure
in the selective model. Based on the CP-ABE scheme [32]
and the Garbled bloom filter [47], Yang et al. [44] realized a
privacy-preserving access control mechanism. However, priva-
cy protection is not formalized in its security proofs. Lewko
et al. [11] proposed the first fully secure CP-ABE scheme,
which is proven secure based on the dual system encryption
methodology [48] in the standard model. Okamoto et al. [49]
presented a fully secure functional encryption scheme, which
covers KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes with non-monotone
access policies. Lai et al. [45] and Jin et al. [46] proposed fully
secure CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access policies.
However, these schemes only support AND gate policies. Note
that, although users’ privacy is preserved in the above policy-
hiding CP-ABE constructions, the decryption test is not con-
sidered. Partially hidden CP-ABE schemes in [14], [15], [38],
[39] further realize decryption tests. However, the schemes
in [14], [38], [39] are proven selectively secure and only
allow AND gate policies. Although the scheme [15] supports
LSSS policies and achieves full security, the decryption test is
ineciency in that the number of bilinear pairing operations
linearly increases with the complexity of access policies. In
addition, these schemes cannot support large universe. Lewko
et al. [13] proposed the first unbounded KP-ABE scheme,
which can support a large attribute universe in composite order
groups. Furthermore, Rouselakis et al. [50] proposed both
KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes supporting large universe in
groups of prime orders. Most recently, Cui et al. [40] proposed
a partially hidden CP-ABE scheme supporting LSSS policies
and large universe based on [50], however, the scheme is
proven secure in the random oracle model and cannot achieve
full security. Especially, the scheme fails to support decryption
test before full decryption and hence it is ineciency even if
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S-Health Cloud
S-Health Authority
Data Owner Data User
Encrypted SHR
Pollution
Local Server
policy-hiding
Encrypted SHR
match-then-decrypt
Base Station Status Affiliation DepartmentSSN
Authorization Authorization
Smart Device
WBAN
No sensitive attribute values
Bluetooth
WLAN
Fig. 2. Architecture of the privacy-aware s-health access control system.
it is designed based on groups of prime order.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
the system architecture and adversary model in Section II.
Some preliminaries are given in Section III. In Section IV,
we describe a formalized definition and a security model of
PH-CP-ABE. The proposed PASH is presented in Section V.
Our security and performance analysis is given in Section VI.
Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section VII. To make
the paper complete and easy to follow, we present detailed
security proofs in the APPENDIX.
II. System Architecture and Design Goals
A. System Architecture
As depicted in Fig. 2, four generic entities, S-Health Au-
thority (SHA), S-Health Cloud (SHC), Data Owner (DO), and
Data User (DU) are involved in the privacy-aware s-health
access control system, which are described below.
 SHA is in charge of the system initialization and user
authorization. It is trustworthy and grants fine-grained access
privileges to DUs based on their attributes.
 SHC has abundant storage capacity and stores encrypted
SHRs and their partially hidden access policies from DO.
 DO owns and manages SHRs, and outsources them to SHC
in the form of ciphertexts for health care. DO can be a
patient or a hospital which manages SHRs on behalf of its
patients. DO has local servers, smart devices, and a WBAN
which consists of a number of wearable or implantable
sensors and a controller. SHRs from sensors or other smart
devices are encrypted by the WBAN controller or the local
server, and then are sent to SHC with the help of base
stations for sharing with DU. DO is responsible for defining
and enforcing access policies for encrypted SHRs.
 DU is a SHR user, such as a doctor or a medical researcher,
who needs to access the encrypted SHRs on SHC. Every
DU possesses a set of attributes and a secret key associated
with the set of attributes. If a DU’s set of attributes matches
the underlying hidden access policy attached to an encrypted
SHR, then he can successfully pass the attribute matching
and decrypt the encrypted SHR.
We now give an overview of the proposed PASH system.
 Initialization. SHA initializes the system by generating
system public parameters and a master key. Each user can
get the system public parameters.
 Authorization. SHA grants access rights to DU by issuing
a secret key based on the DU’s set of attributes. Similarly,
DO can also get his own secret key if necessary.
 Privacy-Aware SHR Outsourcing. Given a SHR, DO
specifies an access policy and uses it to encrypt the SHR.
The encrypted SHR is outsourced to SHC for health care
while the access policy is partially hidden.
 Privacy-Aware SHR Access. After obtaining an encrypted
SHR from SHC, DU first uses his secret key to check
whether his attributes match the underlying access policy,
and then decrypt the encrypted SHR only if the matching is
successful.
B. Adversary Model and Design Goals
In PASH, SHC is assumed to be honest-but-curious. Ex-
actly, it honestly performs the various procedures of PASH
according to system specifications while trying to learn secret
information from encrypted SHRs as much as possible. Both
full data security and attribute privacy protection are taken
into consideration, where “full” means the adversary does
not need to declare which SHR is his target before getting
system public parameters. Note that the adversary can be
either a malicious DU or a combination of multiple DUs
and SHC. As for data security, the adversary can eavesdrop
encrypted SHRs transmitted on public channels and try to
access SHRs it is not authorized to access. With respect
to attribute privacy protection, the adversary aims to extract
information on sensitive attribute values from encrypted SHRs.
Concretely, we consider security requirements as below.
 SHR Confidentiality. The outsourced SHRs are private and
sensitive for DOs, and hence should be protected from
unauthorized access.
 Collusion-Resistance. Dierent users and SHC may collude
by combining their secret keys to read SHRs anyone of them
is not authorized to access. These collusion attacks must be
prevented for data security.
 Attribute Privacy Protection. In PASH, specific attribute
values associated with access policies are sensitive, which
should be hidden in encrypted SHRs for privacy protection.
Besides, we aim to address the following performance issues.
 Ecient Decryption Test. For the sake of practicality, it is
desirable for DUs in PASH to eciently check before full
decryption whether or not his attributes match the access
policy associated with the encrypted SHR.
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 Expressive Access Policy. In order to realize fine-grained
access control on SHRs in PASH, the access policy should
be as expressive as possible.
 Large Universe. As mentioned before, it is desirable for
PASH to support an attribute universe of exponential scale
while keeping the expressiveness of access policies.
III. Preliminaries
In Table I, we summarize the notations used in PASH.
TABLE I
Notation Description.
Notations Descriptions
a 2R A The element a is randomly chosen from the set A.
jAj The number of elements in the set A.
G,GT Two cyclic multiplicative groups.
Gpi A subgroup of G with prime order pi.
SKS A secret key associated with an attribute set S.
S = (IS ; S ) IS denotes the attribute name index,S is the attribute value set.
CTA A CP-ABE ciphertext associated with an access policy A.
A = (A; ;T )
A is the access policy matrix,
 maps a row of A to an attribute name index,
T is an attribute value set.
I A minimum authorized set of (A; ).
IA; The set of I.
A. Cryptographic Background
Definition 1 (Composite Order Bilinear Groups): Composite
order bilinear groups are widely used in IBE and ABE
systems, which are first introduced in [51]. We denote by
G a group generator, which takes a security parameter 
as inputs and outputs a description of a bilinear group G.
We define the output of G as (N; p1; p2; p3; p4;G;GT ; eˆ) with
G = Gp1  Gp2  Gp3  Gp4 , where p1; p2; p3; p4 are distinct
primes, G and GT are cyclic groups of order N = p1p2p3p4,
and eˆ : G  G! GT is a bilinear map satisfying:
1) Bilinear: eˆ(ga; hb) = eˆ(g; h)ab for all a; b 2 ZN and g; h 2 G.
2) Non-degenerate: There exists g 2 G such that eˆ(g; g) has
order N in GT .
Assume group operations in G and GT as well as the bilinear
map eˆ are computable in polynomial time with respect to .
Let Gpi be the subgroup of order pi in G for 1  i  4. Note
that for any Xi 2 Gpi and X j 2 Gp j , eˆ(Xi; X j) = 1 holds for
i , j. The subgroups are said to be “orthogonal" to each other.
B. Access Structures and Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Definition 2 (Access Structures [12]): Let U be a set
of parties. A collection A  2U is monotone if 8B 2 A
and C 2 2U: if B  C then C 2 A. An access structure
(resp. monotone access structure) on U is a collection (resp.
monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets of U, i.e.,
A  2U n f;g. The sets in A are called authorized sets,
otherwise, the sets are called unauthorized sets.
Definition 3 (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) [12]):
Let U be the attribute universe, where each attribute includes
two parts: attribute name and its values. Each attribute has
multiple values. An LSSS involves (A; ) on U, where A is
an `  n matrix over Zp which is called the share-generating
matrix and  maps a row of A into an attribute name index.
An LSSS consists of two algorithms:
 Share((A; ); s): This algorithm is used to share a secret
value s based on A. Considering a vector v = (s; y2; :::; yn)T,
where s 2 Zp is the secret to be shared and y2; :::; yn 2R Zp,
then x = Ax  v is a share of the secret s corresponding to
the attribute name indexed by (x).
 Reconstruction(1; :::; `; (A; )): This algorithm is used to
reconstruct s from secret shares. Let P be any authorized
set and I = fij(i) 2 Pg  f1; 2; :::; `g. Then there exists
coecients f!i 2 Zpgi2I such that Pi2I !iAi = (1; 0; :::; 0),
thus we have
P
i2I !ii = s.
We say that I  f1; 2; : : : ; `g satisfies (A; ) if there exists
constants f!igi2I such that Pi2I !iAi = (1; 0; :::; 0). A subset
I of f1; 2; : : : ; `g is said to be a minimum authorized set of
(A; ) if I satisfies (A; ) and any I0  I does not satisfy
(A; ). We define IA; as the set of subsets of f1; 2; : : : ; `g that
are minimum authorized sets of (A; ).
Like [11], [15], [52], we will employ LSSS matrices over
ZN , where N is a composite number. Our proposed scheme
allows arbitrary monotone access structures. Suppose a user
has a secret key associated with an attribute set S = (IS ; S ),
where IS j ZN denotes the attribute name index and the
corresponding attribute value set is S = fsigi2IS . We use
A = (A; ;T ) to represent the adopted access structure, where
T = (t(1); t(2); : : : ; t(`)) is the attribute value set associated
with (A; ). We also say that S matches A if there exists
an I  f1; 2; : : : ; `g satisfying (A; ), f(i)ji 2 Ig  IS and
s(i) = t(i) for each i 2 I.
C. Review of Lai et al.’s Scheme
For easy understanding of our ideas in Section V-A, we
describe the CP-ABE scheme due to Lai et al. [15] as below.
 Setup(1): It takes a security parameter  as input and
runs the group generator G(1) to get (N; p1; p2; p3; p4;
G;GT ; eˆ). Then it sets the attribute universe as U = ZN ,
uniformly chooses ; a 2R ZN , g; h; u1; u2;    ; uN 2R Gp1 ,
X3 2R Gp3 , Z; X4 2R Gp4 and computes Y = eˆ(g; g);H = hZ.
The system public parameters are published as PK =
(N; g; u1; u2;    ; uN ; ga;Y;H; X4), and the master key is
MK = (; h; X3):
 KeyGen(PK;MK;S): Let S = (IS ; S ) with IS  ZN and
S = fsigi2IS . It chooses t 2R ZN , R;R0;Ri 2R Gp3 for i 2 IS ,
and outputs the secret key SKS = (S;K;K0; fKigi2IS ), where
K = ggatR;K0 = gtR0;Ki = (usii h)
tRi:
 Encrypt(PK;M;A): M 2 GT and A = (A; ;T ), where A
is an `  n matrix,  is a map from each row Ax of A to
an attribute name, and T = (t(1); t(2); : : : ; t(`)) 2 Z`N . The
encryption algorithm chooses two vectors v; v0 2R ZnN with
v = (s; v2; : : : ; vn) and v0 = (s0; v02; : : : ; v
0
n). It also uniformly
chooses rx; r0x 2R ZN and Z1;x;Z01;x;Z2;x;Z02;x 2R Gp4 , for 1 
x  `. Then it calculates the ciphertext as
CTA = ((A; ); C˜1;C01; fC1;x;D1;xg1x`; C˜2;C02; fC2;x;D2;xg1x`);
where
C˜1 = MY s;C01 = gs;C1;x = gaAxv(ut(x)(x)H) rxZ1;x;D1;x = grxZ01;x;
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C˜2 = Y s
0
;C02 = g
s0 ;C2;x = gaAxv
0
(ut(x)(x)H)
 r0xZ2;x;D2;x = gr
0
xZ02;x:
 Decrypt(PK;CTA;SKS): Given CTA and SKS, it first calcu-
lates IA; from (A; ). Then it checks if there exists a subset
I 2 IA; that satisfies f(i)ji 2 Ig  IS and
C˜2 =
eˆ(C02;K)Q
i2I

eˆ(C2;i;K0)eˆ(D2;i;K(i))
!i ;
where
P
i2I !iAi = (1; 0; : : : ; 0) for some constants f!igi2I.
If no such I exists, it outputs ? to indicate that S does not
satisfy the partially hidden A. Otherwise, it computes
eˆ(C01;K)Q
i2I

eˆ(C1;i;K0)eˆ(D1;i;K(i))
!i = Y s;
and outputs M = C˜1=Y s.
IV. Formal Definition and Security Model
A. Definition of PH-CP-ABE with Decryption Test
A PH-CP-ABE scheme with decryption test consists of the
following four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, PH.Encrypt and
PH.Decrypt.
 Setup(1)! (PK;MK): The setup algorithm takes a security
parameter  as input. It outputs the system public parameters
PK and a master key MK.
 KeyGen(PK;MK;S) ! SKS: The key generation algorithm
takes as inputs the system public parameters PK, the master
key MK and a set of attributes S. It outputs a secret key
SKS associated with S.
 PH.Encrypt(PK;M;A) ! CTA: The encryption algorithm
takes as inputs the system public key PK, a message M
and an access structure A = (A; ;T ). It ouputs a ciphertext
CTA of M with respect to A. In a PH-CP-ABE scheme, it
is required that the attribute value set T in A is hidden and
it is not explicitly included in CTA.
 PH.Decrypt(PK;CTA;SKS) ! M or ?: The decryption
algorithm takes as inputs the system public key PK, the
ciphertext CTA of a message M with respect to an access
structure A, and the secret key SKS associated with an
attribute set S. It outputs M if S satisfies A, and the
error symbol ? otherwise. Concretely, two phases, attribute
matching detection (i.e., decryption test) and decryption
phase (i.e., full decryption), are involved.
– Matching Phase: It returns ? to terminate the decryption
algorithm with overwhelming probability if S does not
satisfy the partially hidden A. Otherwise, it ends by
initiating the decryption phase.
– Decryption Phase: It returns M.
B. Security Model
In this section, we give the security model for PH-CP-ABE.
It is described as a security game between an adversary A and
a challenger B. The game proceeds as follows:
 Setup. The challenger B runs (PK;MK) Setup(1;U). It
gives the system public key PK to A and keeps MK secret.
 Phase 1. The adversary A adaptively issues a polynomially
bounded number of queries to the following key generation
oracle.
– OKeyGen: The adversary A submits an attribute set S. The
challenger B runs SKS  KeyGen (PK;MK;S), and gives
A the secret key SKS.
 Challenge. Once the adversary A decides that Phase 1 is
over, it submits to the challenger B two messages M0, M1
of equal length and two access structures A1 = (A; ;T0),
A2 = (A; ;T1) with the restriction that A1 and A2 cannot
be satisfied by any of the queried attribute sets in Phase
1. The challenger B flips a random coin  2 f0; 1g, sets
CTA  PH.Encrypt(PK;M;A) and sends CTA to A as
its challenge ciphertext.
 Phase 2. The adversary continues to adaptively query the
challenger for secret keys corresponding to sets of attributes
with the restriction that none of these satisfies A1 and A2.
 Guess: The adversary A outputs a guess bit 0 2 f0; 1g and
wins the game if 0 = .
The advantage of the adversary A in this game is defined
as
Pr[ 0 =  ]   12 , where the probability is taken over the
random bits used by the adversary A and the challenger B.
Definition 4: A CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden ac-
cess structures is fully secure if all polynomial time adversaries
have at most a negligible advantage in the security game.
V. PASH: Privacy-Aware s-Health Access Control System
A. Challenges and Main Idea
In real life, attribute values always contain more sensitive
information than the generic attribute names. Due to this
observation, CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access
policies were proposed [14], [15], [40], [41], [42], in which
the schemes [14], [15] support decryption tests. As shown
in [14], adding an ecient decryption test before the full
decryption is an important way to improve the computation
eciency, especially in the cloud-based s-health scenario
where the cloud server may search and send a lot of CP-ABE
ciphertexts to a user. The CP-ABE scheme [15] supports the
decryption test, but the test is inecient because the number
of expensive pairing operations in the test grows linearly with
the complexity of the access policy.
1) Challenge I: How to realize a large universe con-
struction? In [15], we found that the public parameters
u1; u2;    ; un could be eliminated. In fact, ui is used in the key
generation algorithm for computing a secret key component
Ki = (u
si
i h)
tRi, where si is the user’s attribute value and other
parameters are given or randomly chosen from corresponding
groups. In the encryption algorithm, u(x) is used for comput-
ing ciphertext components C1;x = gaAxv(u
t(x)
(x)H)
 rx  Z1;x and
C2;x = gaAxv
0
(ut(x)(x)H)
 r0x  Z2;x, where t(x) is an attribute value
implicitly specified for the xth row of the matrix in the LSSS
policy and other parameters are given or randomly chosen
from corresponding groups. Because the attribute values are
not sent along with ciphertexts and random values t; rx; r0x are
used in the generation of Ki;C1;x;C2;x, we change u
si
i and u
t(x)
(x)
to gsi and gt(x) , respectively. Hence, the public parameter size
becomes constant and it means a large universe construction.
2) Challenge II: How to significantly improve the
decryption test eciency? In [15], a ciphertext in-
cludes two parts, one is an encryption of the message
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and the other is redundant. The redundant part consist-
s of C˜2 = eˆ(g; g)s
0
;C02 = g
s0 ;C2;x = gaAxv
0
(u(x)t(x)H) r
0
x 
Z2;x;D2;x = gr
0
x  Z02;x and it is used for decryption test. In
each decryption test, the number of pairing operations is not
constant but proportional to the complexity of the cipher-
text policy. It can be easily noted that this is caused byQ
x eˆ(D2;x;K(x))!x . Obviously, K(x) is the only key component
associated with attribute values. Therefore, the only solution
is to update D2;x. In the proposed scheme, we delete C02 from
the ciphertext and change D2;x = gr
0
x  Z02;x to D2 = gs  Z02,
where s is a random value from corresponding group. Besides,
C2;x is changed to C2;x = gaAxv
0
(gt(x)H) s  Z2;x. In this case,Q
x eˆ(D2;x;K(x))!x can be computed by eˆ(D2;
Q
x K
!x
(x)) and the
decryption test eciency is significantly improved. Note that
the size of the ciphertext is also reduced by ` group elements,
where ` is the number of rows of the policy matrix.
3) Challenge III: How to ensure correctness and securi-
ty? Based on the property of bilinear pairings, the correctness
is not aected by the above updating. However, it is not easy
to get the security results by following the security proof in
[15]. For the simplicity of the description, we use some new
symbols in our scheme, where  indicates the parameter is
used for decryption test. Please refer to Section V-B for more
details of the following parameters used in our PASH. Now,
we explain the challenges in our security proofs. First, in the
ciphertext, C˜ = Y s
0
; Cˆ = gs
0
Z;C;x = gaAxv
0
(gt(x)H) s0Z;x,
where s0 is shared by all components and it is the first
element of v. Hence, the related exponents in the security
proofs cannot be chosen as random elements and they must
keep a consistency, which is dierent from the proof in [15].
Second, in a semi-functional key of type 1, the exponent zi
must be the same as the one used in the semi-functional
ciphertext. Loosely speaking, we address these two challenges
by the “orthogonal” subgroups and additionally choosing a
vector v with 0 as the first element to adjust exponents and
keep them consistent in the challenge phase. Third, in the
ciphertext, Cˆ = gs
0
Z, Cˆ1 = gs, where g and Z are chosen
from dierent subgroups. We keep Z in Cˆ but not in Cˆ1.
According to the property of “orthogonal” subgroups, if we
remove Z from Cˆ and set Cˆ = gs
0
, the decryption algorithm
proceeds correctly. However, in this case, any adversary may
use Cˆ to guess some attribue values because s0 is also used
in C;x = gaAxv
0
(gt(x)H) s0Z;x and eˆ(g;Z;x) = 1.
In summary, the dierences between our policy-hiding CP-
ABE scheme and the scheme [15] are threefold. First, the
proposed scheme is a large universe construction. Second,
we reduce the number of expensive pairing operation in a
decryption test from jIj + 2 to 2, where jIj is specified by
the complexity of the access policy. Third, the ciphertext is
reduced by ` group elements.
B. Design Details of PASH
1) Initialization: SHA first takes a security parameter
 as input and runs the group generator G(1) to get
(N; p1; p2; p3; p4; G;GT ; eˆ). Then SHA sets the attribute uni-
verse as U = ZN and performs the setup algorithm as below.
 Setup(1): SHA uniformly chooses ; a 2R ZN , g; h 2R Gp1 ,
X3 2R Gp3 , Z; X4 2R Gp4 and computes Y = eˆ(g; g);H =
hZ. The system public parameters are published as PK =
(N; g; ga;Y;H; X4), and the master key is MK = (; h; X3):
2) Authorization: As shown in Figure 3, suppose DU has an
attribute set S = (IS ; S ) with IS  ZN and S = fsigi2IS . SHA
grants access rights to DU based on the following algorithm
KeyGen.
SHADU
Fig. 3. The authorization in PASH.
 KeyGen(PK;MK;S): SHA uniformly chooses t 2R ZN and
R;R0;Ri 2R Gp3 for i 2 IS . It outputs the secret key SKS =
(S;K;K0; fKigi2IS ), where
K = ggatR;K0 = gtR0;Ki = (gsih)tRi:
3) Privacy-Aware SHR Outsourcing: DO chooses a sym-
metric encryption scheme such as AES and uses it to encrypt
his SHRs. Then, DO specifies an access policy A = (A; ;T ),
where A is an `  n matrix,  is a map from each row Ax
of A to an attribute name, and T = (t(1); t(2); : : : ; t(`)) 2 Z`N .
DO encrypts the symmetric key which is used as a plaintext
M 2 GT in the algorithm PH.Encrypt as below. Finally, as
shown in Figure 4, DO outsources ciphertext data to SHC.
DO SHC
Fig. 4. The privacy-aware SHR outsourcing in PASH.
 PH.Encrypt(PK;M;A): DO chooses two vectors v; v0 2R ZnN
with v = (s; v2; : : : ; vn) and v0 = (s0; v02; : : : ; v
0
n). It also
uniformly chooses Z 2R Gp4 based on X4, rx 2R ZN and
Z;x;Zc;x;Zd;x 2R Gp4 based on X4, for 1  x  `. Then it
calculates the ciphertext as
CTA = ((A; ); C˜; Cˆ; fC;xg1x`; C˜1; Cˆ1; fC1;x;D1;xg1x`);
where C˜ = Y s
0
; Cˆ = gs
0
Z;C;x = gaAxv
0
(gt(x)H) s0Z;x;
C˜1 = M  Y s; Cˆ1 = gs; and
C1;x = gaAxv(gt(x)H) rxZc;x;D1;x = grxZd;x:
4) Privacy-Aware SHR Access: DU can get SHRs based
on the symmetric key, which acts as the plaintext M and
is obtained in the algorithm PH.Decrypt as below. Let the
ciphertext of M be
CTA = ((A; ); C˜; Cˆ; fC;xg1x`; C˜1; Cˆ1; fC1;x;D1;xg1x`);
and the attribute secret key of DU be SKS = (S;K;K0; fKigi2IS )
with S = (IS ; S ) and S = fsigi2IS . Two phases in decryption
of M are shown in Figure 5.
 PH.Decrypt(PK;CTA;SKS): DU first calculates IA; from
(A; ), where IA; denotes the set of minimum subsets of
f1; 2; : : : ; `g that satisfies (A; ). Then DU does the following.
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DUSHC
Fig. 5. The privacy-aware SHR access in PASH.
– Matching Phase: It checks if there exists a subset I 2 IA;
that satisfies f(i)ji 2 Ig  IS and
C˜ 1 = eˆ
0BBBBBB@Y
i2I
C!i
;i;K
0
1CCCCCCA eˆ
0BBBBBB@Cˆ;K 1Y
i2I
K!i(i)
1CCCCCCA ;
where
P
i2I !iAi = (1; 0; : : : ; 0) for some constants f!igi2I.
If no such I exists, it outputs ? to indicate that S does
not satisfy the partially hidden A. Otherwise, it initiates
the decryption phase based on the eligible I and f!igi2I.
– Decryption Phase: It returns M = C˜1=E, where
E =
eˆ(Cˆ1;K)Q
i2I

eˆ(C1;i;K0)eˆ(D1;i;K(i))
!i :
C. Soundness of PASH
The proposed PASH achieves soundness, which means DU
can access some SHRs if and only if his attributes match the
underlying access policy. For one thing, the matching phase
is correct. Indeed,
C˜ 1 = eˆ
0BBBBB@Y
i2I
C!i
;i;K
0
1CCCCCA eˆ 0BBBBB@Cˆ;K 1 Y
i2I
K!i(i)
1CCCCCA
() C˜ = eˆ(Cˆ;K)Q
i2I

eˆ(C;i;K0)eˆ(Cˆ;K(i))
!i :
If and only if t(i) = s(i), for i 2 I, we have
eˆ(Cˆ;K)Q
i2I

eˆ(C;i;K0)eˆ(Cˆ;K(i))
!i
=
eˆ(gs
0
Z; ggatR)Q
i2I

eˆ(gaAi v0 (gt(i)H) s0Z;i; gtR0)eˆ(gs
0Z; (gs(i)h)tR(i))
!i
=
eˆ(gs
0
; ggat)Q
i2I
 
eˆ(gaAi v0 ; gt)
!i = eˆ(gs0 ; ggat)(eˆ(ga; gt))(Pi2I !iAi)v0 = C˜:
For another, the decryption phase is correct. In fact, if S
satisfies A, there exists an eligible set I and constants f!igi2I
such that
P
i2I !iAi = (1; 0; : : : ; 0), t(i) = s(i) for i 2 I, and
E =
eˆ(Cˆ1;K)Q
i2I

eˆ(C1;i;K0)eˆ(D1;i;K(i))
!i
=
eˆ(gs; ggatR)Q
i2I

eˆ(gaAi v(gt(i)H) riZc;i; gtR0)eˆ(griZd;i; (gs(i)h)tR(i))
!i
=
eˆ(gs; ggat)Q
i2I (eˆ(gaAi v; gt))
!i
=
eˆ(gs; ggat)
(eˆ(ga; gt))(
P
i2I !iAi)v = Y
s:
Therefore, the proposed PASH is sound.
VI. Security and Performance Analysis
A. Security Analysis
Based on hybrid encryption mechanisms, if the proposed
PH-CP-ABE is secure, then PASH is secure in our adversary
model. Our security proofs are based on several complexity
assumptions as below. Note that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are
the same assumptions as in [11], and they are used as in [15] in
the group of composite order. Assumption 4 was used in [53],
[15]. The assumptions were proved to be generically secure
in [54], [53].
Assumption 1. Given a group generator G, define the follow-
ing distribution:
(N = p1p2p3p4;G;GT ; eˆ)
R   G; g R   Gp1 ; X3
R   Gp3 ; X4
R   Gp4 ;
D = (N;G;GT ; eˆ; g; X3; X4);T1
R   Gp1  Gp2 ;T2
R   Gp1 :
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption
is Adv1G;A() = jPr[A(D;T1) = 1]   Pr[A(D; T2) = 1]j:
Definition 5: G satisfies Assumption 1 if Adv1G;A() is a
negligible function of  for any probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) algorithm A.
Assumption 2. Given a group generator G, define the follow-
ing distribution:
(N = p1p2p3p4;G;GT ; eˆ)
R   G;
g; X1
R   Gp1 ; X2;Y2
R   Gp2 ; X3; Y3
R   Gp3 ; X4
R   Gp4 ;
D = (N;G;GT ; eˆ; g; X1X2;Y2Y3; X3; X4);
T1
R   Gp1  Gp2  Gp3 ;T2
R   Gp1  Gp3 :
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption
is Adv2G;A() = jPr[A(D;T1) = 1]   Pr[A(D; T2) = 1]j:
Definition 6: G satisfies Assumption 2 if Adv2G;A() is a
negligible function of  for any PPT algorithm A.
Assumption 3. Given a group generator G, define the follow-
ing distribution:
(N = p1p2p3p4;G;GT ; eˆ)
R   G; ; s R   ZN ;
g
R   Gp1 ; g2; X2;Y2
R   Gp2 ; X3
R   Gp3 ; X4
R   Gp4 ;
D = (N;G;GT ; eˆ; g; g2; gX2; gsY2; X3; X4);
T1 = eˆ(g; g)s;T2
R   GT :
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption
is Adv3G;A() = jPr[A(D;T1) = 1]   Pr[A(D; T2) = 1]j:
Definition 7: G satisfies Assumption 3 if Adv3G;A() is a
negligible function of  for any PPT algorithm A.
Assumption 4. Given a group generator G, define the follow-
ing distribution:
(N = p1p2p3p4;G;GT ; eˆ)
R   G; t0; r0 R   ZN ; g; h R   Gp1 ;
g2; X2; A2; B2;D2
R   Gp2 ; X3
R   Gp3 ; X4; Z; A4;D4
R   Gp4 ;
D = (N;G;GT ; eˆ; g; g2; gt
0
B2; ht
0
Y2; X3; X4; hZ; gr
0
D2D4);
T1 = hr
0
A2A4;T2
R   Gp1  Gp2  Gp4 :
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption
is Adv4G;A() = jPr[A(D;T1) = 1]   Pr[A(D; T2) = 1]j:
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Definition 8: G satisfies Assumption 4 if Adv4G;A() is a
negligible function of  for any PPT algorithm A.
Theorem 1: If Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold, then the pro-
posed PH-CP-ABE scheme is fully secure in our formalized
security model based on Definition 4.
Proof. Security proofs are given in the APPENDIX A. 
B. Performance Analysis
In this section, we compare our scheme with previous
related work [41], [42], [43], [45], [46], [40], [14], [15]
in terms of security and performance features. In Table II,
we give comprehensive comparisons according to important
features including privacy protection, decryption test, large
universe, full security, access policy expressiveness, group type
and security model. From Table II, we know that every scheme
realizes users’ privacy protection. However, only PASH and
schemes in [14], [15] are capable of supporting decryption
test. Only PASH and the scheme in [40] are large universe
constructions. Full security is realized in PASH and the
schemes in [45], [46], while only PASH supports LSSS access
policies. In addition, PASH is proven secure in the standard
model under static assumptions. The scheme in [40] cannot
support decryption test and is proven secure under non-static
assumptions. Based on the above comparisons, only PASH and
Lai et al.’s scheme [15] can simultaneously realize decryption
test and full security while the latter cannot support large
universe. We further compare PASH with the scheme in [15]
in Table III, where PK, SK and CT respectively denote the
public parameters, the secret key and the SHR ciphertext.
Note that the length of an element in each subgroup Gpi
and the target group GT is set to 512 bits. We use Pair,
Exp and ExpT to represent a bilinear pairing operation, an
exponentiation operation in G and an exponentiation operation
in GT , respectively. Let N denote the size of the attribute
universe, m the number of a user’s attributes, and ` the number
of rows in a policy matrix. Note that the minimum authorized
set I is used in the SHR access phase and its size jIj is
determined by the complexity of the access policy. From Table
III, we know that the size of PK in PASH is small and constant,
while it increases linearly with N in [15]. In addition, PASH is
superior to [15] with respect to the size of CT, the encryption
cost (i.e. the SHR outsourcing time), and the decryption test
cost. The comparison of parameter size is also shown in Figure
6 for clarity.
To explicitly demonstrate the performance advantage of
PASH, we implement PASH and the scheme in [15] on a
laptop (with 2.90 GHz Intel Pentium(R) CPU and 4 GB
RAM memory) based on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and the Java
Pairing Based Cryptography Library (JPBC) 2.0.0 [55]. We
evaluate the computation time of the SHR outsourcing phase,
the attribute matching phase, and the entire SHR access phase.
In our experiments, Type A1 pairings are adopted, which are
constructed on the curve y2 = x3+ x over the field FN with the
composite N being the universe size. For each access policy,
the experiment is repeated 30 times, and the average values are
adopted. In Figure 7, we compare PASH and [15] in terms of
the SHR encryption time and the decryption test time. Figure
7(a) and Figure 7(b) respectively show the SHR encryption
time and the decryption time versus the complexity jIj of
access policy, which is measured by the size of the minimum
authorized set I. The comparison of SHR access time is shown
in Figure 8, in which for a given jIj, the access time varies with
the number of SHR ciphertexts. In practice, the SHC server
may search and send a lot of CP-ABE ciphertexts to DU of
which only one can be decrypted. Therefore, in Figure 8(a),
Figure 8(b), Figure 8(c) and Figure 8(d), the number of valid
ciphertexts is 1 and jIj is set to 2, 5, 10 and 20, respectively.
Obviously, our experiment results show that PASH is very
ecient in addition to possessing other attractive features.
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Fig. 7. The SHR encryption and decryption test time.
In summary, PASH is superior to the existing schemes
since it can handle the most expressive access policies and
is fully secure in the standard model. In particular, PASH
supports large universe and the decryption test is most ecient.
Therefore, PASH is highly suitable for data security and
privacy protection in s-health.
VII. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we eciently addressed data security and user
privacy issues in s-health by introducing PASH, a privacy-
aware s-health access control system. The main building block
of PASH is a CP-ABE scheme which supports large uni-
verse and partially hidden access policies. In PASH, sensitive
attribute values involved in access policies are hidden and
generic attribute names are public. We added an ecient
decryption test before full decryption to improve eciency.
The large universe construction enables public parameters of
a constant number of group elements. In addition, PASH
supports LSSS policies and was proven fully secure in the
standard model. Theoretical analysis and experimental results
indicated that PASH is more secure, ecient, and expressive
than existing schemes.
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TABLE II
Comparisons of CP-ABE schemes
Schemes Privacy Aware Decryption Test Large Universe Full Security Expressiveness Group Order Standard Model
[41], [42] X    ANDy Prime 
[43] X    AND Prime X
[45], [46] X   X AND Composite X
[40] X  X  LSSS Prime 
[14] X X   AND Prime 
[15] X X  X LSSS Composite X
Ours X X X X LSSS Composite X
y AND-gates on two/multi-valued attributes with wildcards.
TABLE III
Performance comparisons between fully secure CP-ABE supporting decryption test
Schemes PK Size SK Size CT Size Encryption Cost Decryption Test Cost Decryption Phase Cost
Gpi GT Gpi p j Gpi p j GT Exp ExpT Pair Exp ExpT Pair Exp ExpT
[15] N + 4 1 m + 2 4` + 2 2 7jIj + 2 2 jIj + 2 jIj jIj jIj + 2 jIj jIj
Ours 4 1 m + 2 3` + 2 2 6jIj + 2 2 2 2jIj 0 jIj + 2 jIj jIj
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Fig. 8. The SHR Access Time.
It would be interesting to construct a privacy-preserving
and fully-secure s-health system supporting large universe and
ecient decryption test under prime order groups. Another
possible goal for future research would be to find attribute
revocation and traceability mechanisms suitable for s-health.
Acknowledgment
We are grateful to the associate editor and reviewers for
their invaluable suggestions. This research is supported by the
National Key R&D Program of China (2017YFB0802000), the
AXA Reserch Fund, the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (Nos. 61772418, 61472472, 61402366), the Natural
Science Basic Research Plan in Shaanxi Province of China
(No. 2015JQ6236). Yinghui Zhang is supported by New Star
Team of Xi’an University of Posts & Telecommunications.
References
[1] A. Solanas, C. Patsakis, M. Conti, I. S. Vlachos, V. Ramos, F. Falcone,
O. Postolache, P. A. Pérez-Martínez, R. Di Pietro, D. N. Perrea et al.,
“Smart health: a context-aware health paradigm within smart cities,”
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 8, pp. 74-81, 2014.
[2] Y. Yuehong, Y. Zeng, X. Chen, and Y. Fan, “The internet of things in
healthcare: An overview,” Journal of Industrial Information Integration,
vol. 1, pp. 3-13, 2016.
[3] L. Da Xu, W. He, and S. Li, “Internet of things in industries: A survey,”
IEEE Transactions on industrial informatics, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 2233-
2243, 2014.
[4] S. Li, L. Da Xu, and S. Zhao, “5g internet of things: A survey,”
Journal of Industrial Information Integration, 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jii.2018.01.005
[5] C. Wang, Z. Bi, and L. Da Xu, “Iot and cloud computing in automa-
tion of assembly modeling systems,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial
Informatics, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 1426-1434, 2014.
[6] X. Zheng, P. Martin, K. Brohman, and L. Da Xu, “Cloudqual: a quality
model for cloud services,” IEEE transactions on industrial informatics,
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 1527-1536, 2014.
[7] B. Xu, L. Xu, H. Cai, L. Jiang, Y. Luo, and Y. Gu, “The design of
an m-health monitoring system based on a cloud computing platform,”
Enterprise Information Systems, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 17-36, 2017.
[8] A. Sahai and B. Waters, “Fuzzy identity-based encryption,” in Advances
in Cryptology (EUROCRYPT’05), 2005, pp. 557-557.
[9] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryp-
tion for fine-grained access control of encrypted data,” in Proceedings of
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, (CCS’06),
2006, pp. 89-98.
[10] J. Katz, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Predicate encryption supporting
disjunctions, polynomial equations, and inner products,” in Proceedings
of International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Crypto-
graphic Techniques (EUROCRYPT’08), 2008, pp. 146-162.
[11] A. Lewko, T. Okamoto, A. Sahai, K. Takashima, and B. Waters,
“Fully secure functional encryption: Attribute-based encryption and
(hierarchical) inner product encryption,” in Proceedings of International
Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
(EUROCRYPT’10), 2010, pp. 62-91.
[12] A. Beimel, “Secure schemes for secret sharing and key dis-
tribution,” Ph.D. dissertation, Technion-Israel Institute of Tech-
nology, Faculty of Computer Science, 1996. Available: http-
s://www.cs.bgu.ac.il/~beimel/Papers/thesis.pdf
[13] A. Lewko and B. Waters, “Decentralizing attribute-based encryption,” in
Proceedings of International Conference on the Theory and Applications
of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT’11), 2011, pp. 568-588.
[14] Y. Zhang, X. Chen, J. Li, D. S. Wong, and H. Li, “Anonymous attribute-
based encryption supporting ecient decryption test,” in Proceedings
of ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications
Security (ASIACCS’13), 2013, pp. 511-516.
[15] J. Lai, R. H. Deng, and Y. Li, “Expressive cp-abe with partially hidden
access structures,” in Proceedings of ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS’12), 2012, pp. 18-
19.
[16] H. Yan, L. D. Xu, Z. Bi, Z. Pang, J. Zhang, and Y. Chen, “An emerg-
ing technology-wearable wireless sensor networks with applications in
human health condition monitoring,” Journal of Management Analytics,
vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 121-137, 2015.
[17] M. Salayma, A. Al-Dubai, I. Romdhani, and Y. Nasser, “Wireless
body area network (wban): A survey on reliability, fault tolerance, and
technologies coexistence,” ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 50, no. 1, p. 3,
2017.
2327-4662 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/JIOT.2018.2825289, IEEE Internet of
Things Journal
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. 3, NO. 1, APRIL 2018 11
[18] F. Hu, X. Liu, D. Sui, M. Shao, and L. Wang, “Performance analysis
of reliability in wireless body area networks,” IET Communications,
vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 925-929, 2017.
[19] Q. Han, Y. Zhang, X. Chen, H. Li, and J. Quan, “Ecient and robust
identity-based hando authentication in wireless networks,” in Pro-
ceedings of International Conference on Network and System Security
(NSS’12), 2012, pp. 180-191.
[20] Y. Zhang, X. Chen, J. Li, and H. Li, “Generic construction for secure
and ecient hando authentication schemes in eap-based wireless
networks,” Computer Networks, vol. 75, pp. 192-211, 2014.
[21] B. Xu, L. Da Xu, H. Cai, C. Xie, J. Hu, and F. Bu, “Ubiquitous
data accessing method in iot-based information system for emergency
medical services,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 10,
no. 2, pp. 1578-1586, 2014.
[22] X. Zheng, P. Martin, K. Brohman, and L. Da Xu, “Cloud service
negotiation in internet of things environment: A mixed approach,” IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 1506-1515,
2014.
[23] S. K. Datta, C. Bonnet, and N. Nikaein, “An iot gateway centric
architecture to provide novel m2m services,” in Proceedings of IEEE
World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT’14), 2014, pp. 514-519.
[24] F. Liu, C.-W. Tan, E. T. Lim, and B. Choi, “Traversing knowledge
networks: an algorithmic historiography of extant literature on the
internet of things (iot),” Journal of Management Analytics, vol. 4, no. 1,
pp. 3-34, 2017.
[25] Y. Zhang, D. Zheng, X. Chen, J. Li, and H. Li, “Ecient attribute-
based data sharing in mobile clouds,” Pervasive and Mobile Computing,
vol. 28, pp. 135-149, 2016.
[26] C.-K. Chu, S. S. Chow, W.-G. Tzeng, J. Zhou, and R. H. Deng, “Key-
aggregate cryptosystem for scalable data sharing in cloud storage,” IEEE
transactions on parallel and distributed systems, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 468-
477, 2014.
[27] M. Ali, S. U. Khan, and A. V. Vasilakos, “Security in cloud computing:
Opportunities and challenges,” Information Sciences, vol. 305, pp. 357-
383, 2015.
[28] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption,” in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP’07), 2007, pp. 321-334.
[29] L. Cheung and C. Newport, “Provably secure ciphertext policy abe,”
in Proceedings of ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS’07), 2007, pp. 456-465.
[30] Z. Wan, J. Liu, and R. H. Deng, “Hasbe: a hierarchical attribute-based
solution for flexible and scalable access control in cloud computing,”
IEEE transactions on information forensics and security, vol. 7, no. 2,
pp. 743-754, 2012.
[31] Y. Zhang, D. Zheng, X. Chen, J. Li, and H. Li, “Computationally
ecient ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with constant-size
ciphertexts,” in Proceedings of International Conference on Provable
Security (ProvSec’14), 2014, pp. 259-273.
[32] B. Waters, “Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption: An expressive,
ecient, and provably secure realization,” in Proceedings of Internation-
al Workshop on Public Key Cryptography (PKC’11), 2011, pp. 53-70.
[33] J. Li, Y. Zhang, X. Chen, and Y. Xiang, “Secure attribute-based data
sharing for resource-limited users in cloud computing,” Computers &
Security, vol. 72, pp. 1-12, 2018.
[34] S. Yu, C. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Attribute based data sharing with
attribute revocation,” in Proceedings of ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS’10), 2010, pp. 261-
270.
[35] Y. Zhang, X. Chen, J. Li, H. Li, and F. Li, “Fdr-abe: Attribute-
based encryption with flexible and direct revocation,” in Proceedings of
International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative
Systems (INCoS’13), 2013, pp. 38-45.
[36] Z. Liu, Z. Cao, and D. S. Wong, “Blackbox traceable cp-abe: how to
catch people leaking their keys by selling decryption devices on ebay,”
in Proceedings of ACM Conference on Computer & Communications
Security (CCS’13), 2013, pp. 475-486.
[37] Y. Zhang, J. Li, D. Zheng, X. Chen, and H. Li, “Accountable large-
universe attribute-based encryption supporting any monotone access
structures,” in Proceedings of Australasian Conference on Information
Security and Privacy (ACISP’16), 2016, pp. 509-524.
[38] Y. Zhang, J. Li, X. Chen, and H. Li, “Anonymous attribute-based
proxy re-encryption for access control in cloud computing,” Security
and Communication Networks, vol. 9, no. 14, pp. 2397-2411, 2016.
[39] Y. Zhang, X. Chen, J. Li, D. S. Wong, and H. Li, “Ensuring attribute
privacy protection and fast decryption for outsourced data security in
mobile cloud computing,” Information Sciences, vol. 379, pp. 42-61,
2017.
[40] H. Cui, R. H. Deng, G. Wu, and J. Lai, “An ecient and expressive
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme with partially hid-
den access structures,” in Proceedings of International Conference on
Provable Security (ProvSec’16), 2016, pp. 19-38.
[41] T. Nishide, K. Yoneyama, and K. Ohta, “Abe with partially hidden
encryptor-specified access structure,” in Proceedings of International
Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS’08),
2008, pp. 111-129.
[42] J. Li, K. Ren, B. Zhu, and Z. Wan, “Privacy-aware attribute-based
encryption with user accountability,” in Proceedings of International
Conference on Information Security (ISC’09), 2009, pp. 347-362.
[43] T. V. X. Phuong, G. Yang, and W. Susilo, “Hidden ciphertext policy
attribute-based encryption under standard assumptions,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 35-45,
2016.
[44] K. Yang, Q. Han, H. Li, K. Zheng, Z. Su, and X. Shen, “An ecient
and fine-grained big data access control scheme with privacy-preserving
policy,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 563-571,
2017.
[45] J. Lai, R. H. Deng, and Y. Li, “Fully secure cipertext-policy hiding
cp-abe,” in Proceedings of International Conference on Information
Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC’11), 2011, pp. 24-39.
[46] C. Jin, X. Feng, and Q. Shen, “Fully secure hidden ciphertext policy
attribute-based encryption with short ciphertext size,” in Proceedings
of International Conference on Communication and Network Security
(ICCNS’16), 2016, pp. 91-98.
[47] C. Dong, L. Chen, and Z. Wen, “When private set intersection meets
big data: an ecient and scalable protocol,” in Proceedings of ACM
Conference on Computer & Communications Security (CCS’13), 2013,
pp. 789-800.
[48] B. Waters, “Dual system encryption: Realizing fully secure ibe and
hibe under simple assumptions,” in Proceedings of Annual International
Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO’09), 2009, pp. 619-636.
[49] T. Okamoto and K. Takashima, “Fully secure functional encryption with
general relations from the decisional linear assumption,” in Proceedings
of Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO’10), 2010, pp.
191-208.
[50] Y. Rouselakis and B. Waters, “Practical constructions and new proof
methods for large universe attribute-based encryption,” in Proceedings
of ACM Conference on Computer & Communications security (CCS’13),
2013, pp. 463-474.
[51] D. Boneh, E.-J. Goh, and K. Nissim, “Evaluating 2-dnf formulas on
ciphertexts,” in Proceedings of Theory of Cryptography Conference
(TCC’05), 2005, pp. 325-341.
[52] A. Lewko and B. Waters, “New proof methods for attribute-based
encryption: Achieving full security through selective techniques,” in Pro-
ceedings of Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO’12),
2012, pp. 180-198.
[53] A. De Caro, V. Iovino, and G. Persiano, “Fully secure anonymous hibe
and secret-key anonymous ibe with short ciphertexts,” in Proceedings of
International Conference on Pairing-Based Cryptography (Pairing’10),
2010, pp. 347-366.
[54] A. Lewko and B. Waters, “New techniques for dual system encryption
and fully secure hibe with short ciphertexts,” in Proceedings of Theory
of Cryptography Conference (TCC’10), 2010, pp. 455-479.
[55] A. D. Caro and V. Iovino, “jpbc: Java pairing based cryptography,” in
Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications
(ISCC’11), 2011, pp. 850-855.
Yinghui Zhang (M’18) received his Ph.D degree
in Cryptography from Xidian University, China, in
2013. He is an associate professor at National Engi-
neering Laboratory for Wireless Security (NELWS),
Xi’an University of Posts & Telecommunications.
Currently, he is also a research fellow at Singa-
pore Management University. He has published over
50 research articles including ASIACCS, ACISP,
Computer Networks, Computers & Security. His
research interests include cloud security, public key
cryptography and wireless network security.
2327-4662 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/JIOT.2018.2825289, IEEE Internet of
Things Journal
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. 3, NO. 1, APRIL 2018 12
Dong Zheng received his Ph.D. degree in commu-
nication engineering from Xidian University, Chi-
na, in 1999. He was a Professor at the School
of Information Security Engineering, Shanghai Jiao
Tong University. He is currently a Professor at Na-
tional Engineering Laboratory for Wireless Security
(NELWS), Xi’an University of Posts & Telecom-
munications. He has published over 100 research
articles including CT-RSA, IEEE Transactions on
industrial electronics. His research interests include
cloud computing and public key cryptography.
Robert H. Deng (F’16) is AXA Chair Professor of
Cybersecurity and Professor of Information Systems
in the School of Information Systems, Singapore
Management University since 2004. His research in-
terests include data security and privacy, multimedia
security, network and system security. He served/is
serving on the editorial boards of many international
journals in security, including the IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Trans-
actions on Dependable and Secure Computing, etc.
He is a fellow of the IEEE.
Appendix
We first give the security proof of Theorem 1. Then, we
prove the security of Lemma 2-Lemma 7 in detail.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Following the dual system encryption methodology
[11], we define two additional structures: semi-functional
ciphertext and semi-functional key. These will not be used in
the real system, but will be needed in our proof. Let g2 denote
a generator of the subgroup Gp2 . Semi-functional ciphertexts
and semi-functional keys are created as follows.
Semi-functional Ciphertext. We first choose two exponents
c; c0 2R ZN and two vectors !;!0 2R ZnN . We also choose
zi 2R ZN associated to attributes and x; 0x 2R ZN with respect
to matrix rows Ax. Based on the normal ciphertext output by
PH.Encrypt, the semi-functional ciphertext CTA is set as
CTA = ((A; ); C˜; Cˆ; fC;xg1x`; C˜1; Cˆ1; fC1;x;D1;xg1x`);
where C˜ = Y s
0
; Cˆ = gs
0
Zgc
0
2 and
C;x = gaAxv
0
(gt(x)H) s
0
Z;xg
Ax!0+0xz(x)
2 ;
C˜1 = M  Y s; Cˆ1 = gsgc2;
C1;x = gaAxv(gt(x)H) rxZc;xg
Ax!+xz(x)
2 ;D1;x = g
rxZd;xg
 x
2 :
Semi-functional Key. We choose exponents d; d0 2R ZN and
fdi 2R ZNgi2IS . Then, based on the normal secret key output by
KeyGen, a semi-functional key will take one of three forms.
 A semi-functional key of type 1 is set as
(S;K = ggatRgd2;K0 = gtR0gd
0
2 ; fKi = (gsih)tRigd
0zi
2 gi2IS ):
 A semi-functional key of type 2 is set as
(S;K = ggatRgd2;K0 = gtR0; fKi = (gsih)tRigi2IS ):
 A semi-functional key of type 3 is set as
(S;K = ggatRgd2;K0 = gtR0gd
0
2 ; fKi = (gsih)tRigdi2 gi2IS ):
Lemma 1
Lemma 3
Lemma 4
Lemma 6Lemma 2 Lemma 5
Fig. 9. The relationship between the lemmas and the games.
We will prove the security of the proposed scheme based
on Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 using a hybrid argument over a
sequence of games as below.
 GameReal. The first game is the real security game, in which
the ciphertext and all the keys are normal.
 Game0. In the second game, all the keys are normal, but the
challenge ciphertext is semi-functional. It is also denoted as
Game0;3.
We let q denote the number of key queries made by the
adversary. For 1  k  q, we define the following games.
 Gamek;1. In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semi-
functional, the first k 1 keys are semi-functional of type 3,
the k-th key is semi-functional of type 1, and the remaining
keys are normal.
 Gamek;2. In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semi-
functional, the first k 1 keys are semi-functional of type 3,
the k-th key is semi-functional of type 2, and the remaining
keys are normal.
 Gamek;3. In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semi-
functional, the first k keys are semi-functional of type 3
and the remaining keys are normal. Note that, in Gameq;3,
the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional, all the keys are
semi-functional of type 3.
 GameFinal0 . In this game, the challenge ciphertext is a semi-
functional encryption of a random message, independent of
M0 and M1 provided by the adversary, and all the keys are
semi-functional of type 3.
 GameFinal1 . The final game is the same as GameFinal0 , except
that C;x and C1;x in the challenge ciphertext are random
elements in Gp1  Gp2  Gp4 . The challenge ciphertext is
independent of T0 and T1 provided by the adversary. Hence,
in GameFinal1 , the adversary’s advantage is 0.
We prove these games are indistinguishable based on Lem-
ma 2-Lemma 7 given in the APPENDIX B. The relationship
between the lemmas and the games is given in Fig. 9,
where 2  k  q. Therefore, if Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and
4 hold, we have shown that GameReal is indistinguishable
from GameFinal1 . Hence, the adversary cannot obtain a non-
negligible advantage in breaking the proposed scheme. 
B. Proofs of Lemma 2-Lemma 7
B.1. Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2: Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 1. Then
GameReal and Game0 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A such that
jGameRealAdvA   Game0AdvAj = , then we construct a
simulator B with Adv1G;A() =  in breaking Assumption
1. B is given g; X3; X4;T and simulates GameReal or Game0
with A.
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Setup. B uniformly chooses ; a; a0 2R ZN and Z 2R Gp4 .
It then sets Y = eˆ(g; g); h = ga0 ;H = hZ, and sends A the
system public parameters PK = (N; g; ga;Y;H; X4).
Phase 1. B can generate normal keys in response to A’s key
requests by using the key generation algorithm, since it knows
the master key MK = (; h; X3):
Challenge. Once A submits to B two messages M0, M1
of equal length and two access structures A1 = (A; ;T0),
A2 = (A; ;T1) with the restriction that A1 and A2 cannot be
satisfied by any of the queried attribute sets in Phase 1. Let
T = (t(1); t(2); : : : ; t(`)). B chooses  2 f0; 1g and does the
following.
1) B creates v˜ = (1; v˜2; : : : ; v˜n), v˜0 = (1; v˜02; : : : ; v˜0n) and v =
(0; v;2; : : : ; v;n) with v˜i; v˜0i ; v;i 2R ZN for 2  i  n.
2) B chooses r˜x 2R ZN , sˆx = (a0 + t(x)) 1 and
Z; Z˜;x; Z˜c;x;Zd;x 2R Gp4 , for 1  x  `.
3) B chooses s˜ 2 ZN and calculates
C˜ = eˆ(g;T s˜); Cˆ = T s˜Z;C;x = T s˜aAx v˜
0
T ((Ax v)asˆx s˜)(a0+t(x) )Z˜;x;
C˜1 = M eˆ(g; T ); Cˆ1 = T;C1;x = T aAx v˜T (a0+t(x))r˜x Z˜c;x;D1;x = T r˜xZd;x;
where 1  x  `.
4) B sets the challenge ciphertext as CTA and sends it to A:
CTA = ((A; ); C˜; Cˆ; fC;xg1x`; C˜1; Cˆ1; fC1;x;D1;xg1x`)
If T
$   Gp1Gp2 , let T = gsgc2, then C˜ = Y s
0
; Cˆ = gs
0
Zgc
0
2 ;
C;x = gaAxv
0
(gt(x)H) s
0
Z;xg
Ax!0+0xz(x)
2 ;
where s0 = ss˜, c0 = cs˜, v0 = (ss˜)v˜0 + sv.
We know v01 = s
0, z(x) = a0+t(x), Z;x = Z s
0
Z˜;x, !0 = cs˜av˜0,
0x = c((Ax  v)asˆx   s˜). Besides, C˜1 = MY s; Cˆ1 = gsgc2; and
C1;x = gaAxv(gt(x)H) rxZc;xg
Ax!+xz(x)
2 ;
D1;x = T r˜xZd;x = grxZd;xg
 x
2 ;
where v = sv˜ with v1 = s, rx = sr˜x, Zc;x = Z sr˜x Z˜c;x, z(x) =
a0 + t(x), ! = cav˜, x =  cr˜x. Hence, the challenge ciphertext
is semi-functional and B simulates Game0. If T $   Gp1 , it is
a normal ciphertext and B simulates GameReal.
Phase 2. B does as in Phase 1 with the restriction that none
of queried attribute sets satisfies A1 and A2. Note that, if T
$  
Gp1  Gp2 , then B simulates Game0. If T
$   Gp1 , then B
simulates GameReal. Finally, B can use the output of A to
distinguish T and Adv1G;A() = . 
B.2. Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3: Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 2. Then
Gamek 1;3 and Gamek;1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A such that
jGamek 1;3AdvA Gamek;1AdvAj = , then we can construct a
simulator B with Adv2G;A() =  in breaking Assumption 2. B
is given g; X1X2;Y2Y3; X3; X4;T and will simulate Gamek 1;3
or Gamek;1 with A.
Setup. B uniformly chooses ; a; a0 2R ZN and Z 2R Gp4 .
It then sets Y = eˆ(g; g); h = ga0 ;H = hZ, and sends A the
system public parameters PK = (N; g; ga;Y;H; X4). Note that
B knows the master key MK = (; h; X3):
Phase 1. Let us now explain how B answers the j-th secret
key query for S = (IS ; S ) with S = fsigi2IS .
 For j < k, B chooses t; d˜; d˜0 2R ZN and fd˜i 2R ZNgi2IS , then
creates a semi-functional key of type 3 as follows:
K = ggat(Y2Y3)d˜;K0 = gt(Y2Y3)d˜
0
; fKi = (gsih)t(Y2Y3)d˜i gi2IS :
Note that this is a properly distributed semi-functional key
of type 3 because the values of d˜; d˜0; d˜i modulo p2 are
uncorrelated to their values modulo p3.
 For j > k, B can generate normal keys by using the key
generation algorithm, since it knows the master key MK =
(; h; X3):
 To answer the k-th secret key query, B chooses R˜; R˜0; R˜i 2R
Gp3 for i 2 IS and calculates K = gT aR˜;K0 = TR˜0; fKi =
T a0+si R˜igi2IS : We observe that
– If T
$   Gp1  Gp2  Gp3 , let T = gtgd02 Rˆ, then
K = ggatRgd2;K
0 = gtR0gd
0
2 ; fKi = (gsih)tRigd
0zi
2 gi2IS ;
where R = RˆaR˜, d = ad0, R0 = RˆR˜0, Ri = Rˆa0+si R˜i, zi =
a0 + si. It is a semi-functional key of type 1. Note that
the values of a; a0; si modulo p1 are uncorrelated to their
values modulo p2.
– If T
$   Gp1 Gp3 , it is a properly distributed normal key.
Challenge. Once A submits to B two messages M0, M1
of equal length and two access structures A1 = (A; ;T0),
A2 = (A; ;T1) with the restriction that A1 and A2 cannot be
satisfied by any of the queried attribute sets in Phase 1. Let
T = (t(1); t(2); : : : ; t(`)). B chooses  2 f0; 1g and does the
following.
1) B creates v˜ = (1; v˜2; : : : ; v˜n), v˜0 = (1; v˜02; : : : ; v˜0n) and v =
(0; v;2; : : : ; v;n) with v˜i; v˜0i ; v;i 2R ZN for 2  i  n.
2) B chooses r˜x 2R ZN , sˆx = (a0 + t(x)) 1 and Z; Z˜;x; Z˜c;x;
Zd;x 2R Gp4 , for 1  x  `.
3) B chooses s˜ 2 ZN and calculates
C˜ = eˆ(g; (X1X2)s˜); Cˆ = (X1X2)s˜Z;
C;x = (X1X2)s˜aAxv˜
0
(X1X2)((Axv)asˆx s˜)(a0+t(x))Z˜;x;
C˜1 = Meˆ(g; (X1X2)); Cˆ1 = (X1X2);
C1;x = (X1X2)aAxv˜(X1X2) (a0+t(x))r˜x Z˜c;x;
D1;x = (X1X2)r˜xZd;x;
where 1  x  `.
4) B sets the challenge ciphertext as CTA and sends it to A:
CTA = ((A; ); C˜; Cˆ; fC;xg1x`; C˜1; Cˆ1; fC1;x;D1;xg1x`):
Suppose X1X2 = gsgc2, then C˜ = Y
s0 ; Cˆ = gs
0
Zgc
0
2 ; and
C;x = = gaAxv
0
(gt(x)H) s
0
Z;xg
Ax!0+0xz(x)
2 ;
where s0 = ss˜, c0 = cs˜, z(x) = a0 + t(x), v0 = (ss˜)v˜0 + sv.
We know v01 = s
0, Z;x = Z s
0
Z˜;x, !0 = cs˜av˜0, 0x = c((Ax 
v)asˆx   s˜). Besides, C˜1 = MY s; Cˆ1 = gsgc2; and
C1;x = gaAxv(gt(x)H) rxZc;xg
Ax!+xz(x)
2 ;
D1;x = (X1X2)r˜xZd;x = grxZd;xg
 x
2 ;
where v = sv˜ with v1 = s, rx = sr˜x, Zc;x = Z sr˜x Z˜c;x,
z(x) = a0 + t(x), ! = cav˜, and x =  cr˜x. We know the
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challenge ciphertext is semi-functional. Note that the values
of a; a0; ft(x)g1x`; s˜; fv˜i; v˜0i g2in; fr˜xg1x` modulo p1 are
uncorrelated to their values modulo p2.
Phase 2. B does as in Phase 1 with the restriction that none
of queried attribute sets satisfies A1 and A2. Note that, if T
$  
Gp1 Gp2 Gp3 , then B simulates Gamek;1. If T
$   Gp1 Gp3 ,
then B simulates Gamek 1;3. Finally, B can use the output of
A to distinguish T and Adv2G;A() = . 
B.3. Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4: Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 2. Then
Gamek;1 and Gamek;2 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A such that
jGamek;1AdvA   Gamek;2AdvAj = , then we can construct a
simulator B with Adv2G;A() =  in breaking Assumption 2.
B is given g; X1X2;Y2Y3; X3; X4; T and will simulate Gamek;1
or Gamek;2 with A.
Setup. B uniformly chooses ; a; a0 2R ZN and Z 2R Gp4 .
It then sets Y = eˆ(g; g); h = ga0 ;H = hZ, and sends A the
system public parameters PK = (N; g; ga;Y;H; X4). Note that
B knows the master key MK = (; h; X3):
Phase 1. Let us now explain how B answers the j-th secret
key query for S = (IS ; S ) with S = fsigi2IS . The first k   1
semi-functional keys of type 3 and the normal keys with j > k
are constructed exactly as in Lemma 3.
To answer the k-th key quest, B does as it did in Lemma
3, but B additionally chooses  2R ZN and sets K =
gT aR˜(Y2Y3);K0 = TR˜0; fKi = T a0+si R˜igi2IS : The only change
we have made here is adding the (Y2Y3) term, which random-
izes the Gp2 part of K. Obviously, if T
$   Gp1  Gp2  Gp3 ,
this is a properly distributed semi-functional key of type 1. If
T
$   Gp1  Gp3 , this is a properly distributed semi-functional
key of type 2.
Challenge. The same as Lemma 3.
Phase 2. B does as in Phase 1 with the restriction that none
of queried attribute sets satisfies A1 and A2. Hence, if T
$  
Gp1 Gp2 Gp3 , then B simulates Gamek;1. If T
$   Gp1 Gp3 ,
then B simulates Gamek;2. Finally, B can use the output of A
to distinguish T and Adv2G;A() = . 
B.4. Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5: Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 2. Then
Gamek;2 and Gamek;3 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A such that
jGamek;2AdvA   Gamek;3AdvAj = , then we can construct a
simulator B with Adv2G;A() =  in breaking Assumption 2.
B is given g; X1X2;Y2Y3; X3; X4; T and will simulate Gamek;1
or Gamek;2 with A.
Setup. B uniformly chooses ; a; a0 2R ZN and Z 2R Gp4 .
It then sets Y = eˆ(g; g); h = ga0 ;H = hZ, and sends A the
system public parameters PK = (N; g; ga;Y;H; X4).
Phase 1. Let us now explain how B answers the j-th secret
key query for S = (IS ; S ) with S = fsigi2IS . The first k   1
semi-functional keys of type 3 and the normal keys with j > k
are constructed exactly as in Lemma 3.
Let us now explain how B answers the k-th secret key query.
B chooses exponents r;  2R ZN , R˜; R˜0; R˜i 2R Gp3 for i 2 IS
and calculates
K = gT raR˜(Y2Y3);K0 = T rR˜0; fKi = T (a0+si)rR˜igi2IS :
If T
$   Gp1  Gp2  Gp3 , let T = gt0gd˜2Rˆ, then
K = ggatRgd2;K
0 = gtR0gd
0
2 ; fKi = (gsih)tRigdi2 gi2IS ;
where t = rt0, gd2 = g
ard˜
2 Y

2 , R = Rˆ
arR˜Y3 , R
0 = RˆrR˜0, d0 = rd˜,
Ri = Rˆr(a0+si)R˜i, di = r(a0 + si)d˜.
This is a semi-functional key of type 3. Note that the value
of  modulo p2 is uncorrelated to its value modulo p3. If
T
$   Gp1  Gp3 , this is a properly distributed semi-functional
key of type 2.
Challenge. The same as Lemma 3.
Phase 2. B does as in Phase 1 with the restriction that none
of queried attribute sets satisfies A1 and A2. Hence, if T
$  
Gp1 Gp2 Gp3 , then B simulates Gamek;3. If T
$   Gp1 Gp3 ,
then B simulates Gamek;2. Finally, B can use the output of A
to distinguish T and Adv2G;A() = . 
B.5. Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6: Suppose G satisfies Assumption 3. Then Gameq;3
and GameFinal0 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A such that
jGameq;3AdvA GameFinal0AdvAj = , then we can construct a
simulator B with Adv3G;A() =  in breaking Assumption 3. B
is given g; g2; gX2; gsY2; X3; X4;T and will simulate Gameq;3
or GameFinal0 with A.
Setup. B uniformly chooses a; a0 2R ZN and Z 2R Gp4 . It then
sets Y = eˆ(g; gX2); h = ga0 ;H = hZ, and sends A the system
public parameters PK = (N; g; ga;Y;H; X4).
Phase 1. Each time B is asked to provide a key for S = (IS ; S )
with S = fsigi2IS , B chooses t; d˜; d0 2R ZN , fdi 2R ZNgi2IS , and
R;R0;Ri 2R Gp3 for i 2 IS , then creates a semi-functional key
of type 3 as follows:
K = (gX2)gatRgd˜2 = g
gatRgd2;K
0 = gtR0gd
0
2 ; fKi = (gsih)tRigdi2 gi2IS ;
where gd2 = X2g
d˜
2.
Challenge. Once A submits to B two messages M0, M1
of equal length and two access structures A1 = (A; ;T0),
A2 = (A; ;T1) with the restriction that A1 and A2 cannot be
satisfied by any of the queried attribute sets in Phase 1. Let
T = (t(1); t(2); : : : ; t(`)). B chooses  2 f0; 1g and does the
following.
1) B creates v˜ = (1; v˜2; : : : ; v˜n) with v˜i 2R ZN for 2  i  n, and
chooses v0 = (s0; v02; : : : ; v
0
n); !
0 = (!01; !
0
2; : : : ; !
0
n) 2R ZnN .
2) B chooses r˜x; 0x 2R ZN and Z;Z;x; Z˜c;x;Zd;x 2R Gp4 , for
1  x  `.
3) Let T = (t(1); t(2); : : : ; t(`)). B chooses c0 2 ZN , calculates
C˜ = Y s
0
; Cˆ = gs
0
Zgc
0
2 ; and
C;x = gaAxv
0
(gt(x)H) s
0
Z;xg
Ax!0+0x(a0+t(x))
2 ;
C˜1 = MT; Cˆ1 = gsY2;C1;x = (gsY2)aAxv˜(gsY2) (a0+t(x))r˜x Z˜c;x;
D1;x = (gsY2)r˜xZd;x;
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where 1  x  `.
4) B sets the challenge ciphertext as CTA and sends it to A:
CTA = ((A; ); C˜; Cˆ; fC;xg1x`; C˜1; Cˆ1; fC1;x;D1;xg1x`):
Suppose gsY2 = gsgc2, then C˜ = Y
s0 ; Cˆ = gs
0
Zgc
0
2 ; and
C;x = gaAxv
0
(gt(x)H) s
0
Z;xg
Ax!0+0xz(x)
2 ;
C˜1 = MT; Cˆ1 = gsgc2;C1;x = g
aAxv(gt(x)H) rxZc;xg
Ax!+xz(x)
2 ;
D1;x = (gsY2)r˜xZd;x = grxZd;xg
 x
2 ;
where v = sv˜, rx = sr˜x, Zc;x = Zrx Z˜c;x, ! = cav˜,
x =  cr˜x, and z(x) = a0 + t(x). Note that the values of
a; a0; ft(x)g1x`; fv˜ig2in; fr˜xg1x` modulo p1 are uncorrelated
to their values modulo p2.
Phase 2. B does as in Phase 1 with the restriction that none
of queried attribute sets satisfies A1 and A2. Note that, if
T = eˆ(g; g)s, the challenge ciphertext is a properly distributed
semi-functional encryption of M and B simulates Gameq;3.
Otherwise, it is a properly distributed semi-functional encryp-
tion of a random message in GT and B simulates GameFinal0 .
Finally, B can use the output of A to distinguish T and
Adv3G;A() = . 
B.6. Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7: Suppose G satisfies Assumption 4. Then
GameFinal0 and GameFinal1 are computationally indistinguish-
able.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A such that
jGameFinal0AdvA GameFinal1AdvAj = , then we can construct
a simulator B with Adv4G;A() =  in breaking Assumption
4. B is given g; g2; gt0B2; ht0Y2; X3; X4; hZ; gr0D2D4;T and will
simulate GameFinal0 or GameFinal1 with A.
Setup. B uniformly chooses ; a 2R ZN . It then sets Y =
eˆ(g; g);H = hZ, and sends A the system public parameters
PK = (N; g; ga;Y;H; X4).
Phase 1. Each time B is asked to provide a key for S = (IS ; S )
with S = fsigi2IS , B chooses t˜ 2R ZN , and R;R0;Ri 2R Gp3 for
i 2 IS , then creates a semi-functional key of type 3 as follows:
K = (ggt
0
B2)at˜R;K0 = (gt
0
B2)t˜R0; fKi = (gt0B2)si t˜(ht0Y2)t˜Rigi2IS :
We observe that K = ggatRgd2;K
0 = gtR0gd02 ; fKi =
(gsih)tRig
di
2 gi2IS ; where t = t0 t˜, gd2 = Bat˜2 , gd
0
2 = B
t˜
2, g
di
2 = B
si t˜
2 Y
t˜
2.
Note that it is a properly distributed semi-functional key
of type 3 in that the values of a; t˜; fsig1in modulo p1 are
uncorrelated to their values modulo p2.
Challenge. Once A submits to B two messages M0, M1
of equal length and two access structures A1 = (A; ;T0),
A2 = (A; ;T1) with the restriction that A1 and A2 cannot be
satisfied by any of the queried attribute sets in Phase 1. Let
T = (t(1); t(2); : : : ; t(`)). B chooses  2 f0; 1g and does the
following.
1) B chooses v = (s; v2; : : : ; vn); v˜0 = (s0; v˜02; : : : ; v˜0n); v˜ =
(0; v˜;2; : : : ; v˜;n); and !; !˜0 2R ZnN .
2) B chooses r˜x 2R ZN , sˆx = t 1(x), Z; Z˜;x; Z˜c;x 2R Gp4 , for
1  x  `.
3) B chooses c; c0 2 ZN and calculates for 1  x  `:
C˜ = Y s
0
; Cˆ = gs
0
Zgc
0
2 ;
C;x = gaAx v˜
0
(gr
0
D2D4)(Ax v)aT asˆx(Ax v)t(x) (gt(x)H) s
0
Z˜;xg
Ax !˜0
2 ;
C˜1
$   GT ; Cˆ1 = gsgc2;C1;x = gaAx v(gr
0
D2D4) r˜x t(x)T r˜xg
Ax !
2 Z˜c;x;
D1;x = (gr
0
D2D4)r˜x :
4) B sets the challenge ciphertext as CTA and sends it to A:
CTA = ((A; ); C˜; Cˆ; fC;xg1x`; C˜1; Cˆ1; fC1;x;D1;xg1x`):
If T = hr
0
A2A4, suppose h = g1 , D2 = g

2, A2 = g
2
2
with 1; 2;  2 ZN . Then C˜ = Y s0 ; Cˆ = gs0Zgc02 ; C;x =
gaAxv0 (gt(x)H) s0gAx!
0+0xz(x)
2 Z;x, where v
0 = v˜0 + v(r0 + r01).
We know that v01 = s
0, 0x = (Ax  v)2asˆx(1  
2(t(x) + 2) 1), z(x) = 2 + t(x), Z;x = D(Axv)a4 A
(Axv)a
4 Z˜;x,
!0 = !˜0 + av. Besides, C˜1
$   GT ; Cˆ1 = gsgc2; and
C1;x = gaAxv(gt(x)H) rxg
Ax!+xz(x)
2 Zc;x, D1;x = (g
r0D2D4)r˜x =
grxZd;xg
 x
2 , where rx = r
0r˜x, x =  r˜x, z(x) = 2 + t(x),
Zc;x = D
 r˜xt(x)
4 A
 r˜x
4 Z
r0 r˜x Z˜c;x, Zd;x = D
r˜x
4 .
Phase 2. B does as in Phase 1 with the restriction that none
of queried attribute sets satisfies A1 and A2. Note that, if
T = hr
0
A2A4, the challenge ciphertext is a properly distributed
semi-functional encryption of a random message in GT and
B simulates GameFinal0 . Otherwise, if T
R   Gp1  Gp2  Gp4 ,
the challenge ciphertext component C˜1 is a random element
in GT and C;x;C1;x are random elements in Gp1 Gp2 Gp4 ,
then B simulates GameFinal0 . Finally, B can use the output of
A to distinguish T and Adv4G;A() = . 
